EXHIBIT B

1 (Case called)

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MR. LeQUANG: Good afternoon, your Honor, Khai LeQuang for the plaintiffs.

MR. ROBERTSON: Good afternoon, your Honor, Daniel Robertson for the plaintiffs.

MS. RAPPAPORT: Good afternoon, your Honor, Stacey Rappaport; Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCoy for defendant AXA Equitable Life Insurance Company. With me today are my colleagues, Andrea Hood and Robert Hora.

THE COURT: Good afternoon to all of you. Sorry I'm running a little bit behind.

You and your colleagues are certainly keeping me busy.

We have a number of things to cover today. Let me start with the motion for re-reconsideration that was filed I think yesterday or the day before by plaintiffs, or by EFG, with respect to my ruling with respect to the protective order issue.

I can only describe the most recent motion as a rather thin motion, but for that reason and others it is denied. I think EFG falls far short of demonstrating that there is a basis for reconsideration, let alone re-reconsideration, which is what this motion would be. A description of the new Swiss cases I think AXA describes it as threadbare, and I certainly agree with that.

It is a criminal case, not a civil case, but, more

importantly, given the reasoning of my prior opinion, it's not clear from the threadbare description of the case if the materials at issue were produced with the threat of criminal consequences or procedural consequences. That was the critical distinction in my prior order.

In addition, I cited a decision of the FDJP, stating that Article 271 does not apply to the collection and transfer of one's own information as distinct from transfer of third-party data, and the case at issue in the most recent motion appears to involve the transfer of third-party data rather than, as in this case, EFG's own materials.

On top of that, it's unclear to me from the motion whether or to what extent EFG knew or should have known about that other case when it filed either of its first motions. A letter says that the case was quote/unquote revealed after my last order.

The trial began on April 26 and, granted, I don't know a whole lot about Swiss criminal procedure, but I find it a little hard to imagine that it was secret until after my order. Be that as it may, there was obviously some prior notice of the proceedings writ large since there was reference to the Department of Justice Swiss bank program in prior papers and the present motion relies in part on a four-year-old article regarding disclosure of the data at issue.

For all of those reasons, the motion falls far short

of warranting reconsideration yet again.

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think that additional briefing is appropriate that it's prepared to do so, but as far as I'm concerned, that's not the way motion practice works. If you have an argument to make, you make an argument. You don't make an argument and say, if you don't think that's enough, we are prepared to try again. You've now had, by my count, three times to persuade me, and you have failed to do so, so we are done.

Next, there are two April 27 letter motions on the agenda today. The first is docket No. 143, which AXA moved to compel plaintiffs to produce documents concerning their analyses, valuations, and acquisition of the AULII life insurance policies and to respond to interrogatories concerning the same.

I guess I wanted to get a little bit more of a handle on this and, in particular, get AXA's responses to EFG's response, AXA's reply to the opposition. Namely, I don't quite understand. It seems to me that the issue in this case concerns the mortality assumptions that went into your pricing at an aggregate level, and in that regard their views and calculations in a particular case of someone's life expectancy don't just seem to go to the heart of anything at issue in this case and in that sense strike me as both irrelevant and that the burdens far outweigh the benefits. Tell me why that's

1 wrong.

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MS. RAPPAPORT: Your Honor, in the first instance, plaintiffs have not made any particularized burden argument here. So AXA disagrees that there has been any showing that EFG faces any burden or any of the EFG plaintiffs face any substantial burden that would preclude them from producing the documents.

Your Honor, what is at issue in this case are the reasonableness of the assumptions that AXA used when it increased cost of insurance in this COI increase that it implemented in 2016.

THE COURT: My understanding is that those assumptions were based on essentially data, first of all, mortality data, not life expectancy data, but mortality data, and from thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of policies at the aggregate level, not an individual assessment of life expectancy in any one case.

MS. RAPPAPORT: Your Honor, plaintiffs' individual life expectancy and the reports that show their individual life expectancies relate to their mortality assumptions.

If your Honor would permit, I would like to hand up a document that would show this point very clearly.

MR. LeQUANG: Your Honor, if I may address this document.

THE COURT: You will have your chance in a moment.

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MS. RAPPAPORT: Your Honor, I just want to note for the record that this document, which is Bates stamped EAA00021910 through EAA00021915, was produced by the plaintiffs in this litigation. It is marked confidential.

I conferred with counsel for the EFG plaintiffs prior to the conference today. AXA would agree to redact the insured last name on this document and other identifying information on this document because the last name is included elsewhere. But otherwise takes no position on the confidentiality of this document. And under the confidentiality order your Honor, I believe we have an agreement as to how this document will be handled in terms of its confidentiality. But Mr. LeQuang can speak to that later. We would be happy to address the confidentiality issues and sealing issues in a separate submission, if necessary.

THE COURT: I will table that for a moment. Tell me what significance this has.

MS. RAPPAPORT: Your Honor, whether this is called a life expectancy report or a mortality analysis is really of no moment. Plaintiffs do analyze or someone on behalf of the plaintiff have analyzed the life expectancy of this particular individual in this report. But they have derived, based on that life expectancy, a mortality rate, their own mortality assumptions based on when they believe this individual would perish.

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The mortality rates that are reflected on this schedule are not something that's been brought out of thin air. These are mortality rates that the entity who did this analysis derived from a mortality table that it was using concerning certain mortality assumptions that it had developed and that plaintiffs may have adopted. This was something that was in plaintiff's files which presumably they relied upon which they decided to acquire or otherwise invest in these policies, and this document shows that the mortality assumptions that this entity was assuming would exist for this particular policy showed that the policy was significantly underpriced, that is, that AXA's mortality assumptions were significantly different than the mortality assumptions that this entity was presenting here.

The reason why that's important, your Honor, is because plaintiffs are contending that AXA's mortality assumptions were not reasonable. If AXA's mortality assumptions were not reasonable, we are entitled to show what plaintiffs' mortality assumptions about these very policies were and to explore what mortality tables plaintiffs were relying on, which is something that can be derived from this document and other documents that may support this particular document.

Whether this is called a particular life expectancy report or a mortality analysis, AXA is entitled to say, our

mortality assumptions for an individual of this category, however this person was categorized, whether it's an 82-year-old who met certain underwriting standards, AXA is entitled to look at that particular categorization, look at how AXA recognized that individual, what mortality assumptions applied to that category of individuals and see what mortality assumptions plaintiffs were applying to that individual.

Whether AXA was using plaintiffs' mortality assumptions is not the issue on this motion. The issue is a comparison between the mortality assumptions that plaintiffs were using and the mortality assumptions that AXA was using.

THE COURT: Maybe I'm missing something, which is certainly possible and part of the reason that a conference might be helpful here. The way I understood what you just described is essentially that this document would reveal the application of their mortality assumptions to a particular human being, and that by looking at this you could essentially extrapolate backwards to figure out what those assumptions were.

Can't you skip the extrapolation part? And I think that they are not disagreeing that you are entitled to whatever documents, materials, and information they have concerning their actual mortality assumptions, including whatever tables they are using, whatever illustrations they are relying on, whatever documents they have in their possession concerning

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whatever mortality assumptions that they are using. I certainly agree that that would be relevant and go to the heart of what you are describing and the reasonableness of your own assumptions, but what I'm missing is how the application of those assumptions to a particular person, which is what this document seems to reveal, has any bearing on the argument that you are trying to make.

MS. RAPPAPORT: Your Honor, it is not at all clear what mortality table when plaintiffs said they are intending to produce to us a mortality table. Life settlement investors like plaintiffs in the industry and insurers rely on industry-based mortality tables and then apply their own sets of factors to those mortality tables to determine a mortality assumption. If plaintiffs were just going to give us an industry standard mortality table and say, this is what we based our mortality assumptions on, that doesn't really help us much because we don't understand what other factors they apply to it. They have gotten information about AXA's mortality improvement factors, other multiples in what are called scalers that are applied to the mortality table to come up with what the actual assumption is. And this document, the more detailed information in here would reveal some of that information, whereas a plain vanilla industry mortality table would not, so that is why these types of analyses are important.

THE COURT: Would it not then make sense for you to

wait and see what they provide you in terms of the underlying or overall assumptions are, including whatever tables they are using, whatever tweaks they are using to make it to the industry standards and tables or whatever before you determine whether you need to get into the policy-level assumptions and calculations?

MS. RAPPAPORT: Your Honor, we have been waiting for a very long time, but I am not sure that the mortality assumptions and tables would be enough. Again, we want to see how they were categorizing this particular individual and what mortality rates that they were applying to an individual, and from there we can develop our own analyses about what they were doing across the whole portfolio.

We have been waiting for a very long time for documents from EFG. Their responses to us have not been, A, forthcoming or, B, very revealing about what types of specific information they are going to give us, and we are entitled to see, in our opinion, the mortality analyses that they did when they determined to acquire the policies.

I think another important point, your Honor, that this particular document drives home for us is the view that they knew that this policy was underpriced, that the mortality assumptions that AXA was applying were different from the ones that they would apply, that the mortality assumptions that they would apply were significantly worse than the ones that AXA

would apply, and that's something that we believe we are entitled to show.

THE COURT: Last question. To the extent that burden is a factor here, could you not get what you need with some sampling of the individual policies, that is to say, five or 10 as opposed to all 106 or so that are at issue here?

MS. RAPPAPORT: Again, your Honor, it would depend on what the underlying data is that EFG is prepared to provide. If we had every single mortality table with every single factor that they applied and every single multiple that they were applying to that mortality table, I might be able to come to some agreement to some more limited set of data. But right now if all we are going to get is a standard industry table, that would not be sufficient.

THE COURT: Why is it that you don't have that larger set of materials already?

MS. RAPPAPORT: I think that's a question for Mr.

LeQuang. So far we have received no documents from

Switzerland, despite your Honor's order. The substantial

completion deadline is coming up on May 25. We have received

no e-mails that's the subject of our other motion, and there

has just been a very slow trickle of documents and they have

agreed only to produce only a very limited set of documents,

your Honor, documents, frankly, that are not really the kind of

documents that are essential to our defense of this case. For

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example, they have agreed to give us documents that AXA provided to them, policy files, their premium showing that they paid their premiums. While we want those documents and we appreciate they are agreeing to give those to us, they have not given us the real mortality data that we are looking for and that we need in order to defend against their claims that our 7 assumptions that were applied to the COI increase were unreasonable.

THE COURT: Mr. LeQuang, first, let me take care of an easy matter. Any objection to this document being docketed, assuming that the personal identifying information is redacted?

MR. LeQUANG: With the redaction we are fine with that, your Honor.

THE COURT: Would you prefer to do the redaction? MR. LeQUANG: Yes. We will take a look. One of the issues I think is just whether only the identifying information should be redacted. We will review it and determine whether anything else should be redacted.

THE COURT: Why don't the two sides just confer on that and within the next two days hopefully agree upon as minimal redactions as necessary to ensure the privacy of the person there and docket that.

I think you would be on firmer ground in making the arguments you are making if you had already turned over all of the sort of general materials and information concerning the

mortality assumptions that you were using to make the individual life expectancy calculations. But, number one, it sounds like you haven't done that. Why shouldn't I give them all this? To the extent that you haven't done it, when do you plan to make production of those materials?

MR. LeQUANG: The first thing I want to say, I don't think that's an accurate description of where we stand in the production. There are two plaintiff groups within the EFG group of cases. One is EFG, the bank, with Wells Fargo as securities intermediary. That represents the EFG ownership group.

In addition, there are several trust entities that own policies and that represents an entirely different ownership group, which is EAA, which stands for Erste Abwicklungsanstalt.

Erste Abwicklungsanstalt, or EAA, is a governmental agency, German governmental agency, that was formed to wind up the assets of a German bank called WestLB or Portigon. EAA has virtually completed its production of all of its documents.

There were meet and confer discussions regarding new custodians and EAA is in the process of collecting and producing those documents, but the suggestion that EAA has somehow has not produced documents or not completed its production of documents in a prompt manner is entirely erroneous. The production of those documents would include anything of the ilk that

Ms. Rappaport had just described, including any mortality

1 assumptions or scalers or anything of that kind.

This motion under the issue before us today is with regard to individual policy valuations and individual life expectancies. Those are what we objected to producing, and we specifically, in accordance with the rules, identified that as a category of documents we would not be producing in our first objections in responses to their requests for production months ago.

We reached an impasse based on this discussion and meet and confer long ago in this. I'm happy to discuss it, but the suggestion that we have not produced those documents that are otherwise are more broadly relevant, I don't think that is accurate.

EFG, that group, as your Honor knows, has not produced documents from Switzerland. I don't know what is included within those. But I also think Ms. Rappaport is just speculating that there are things like mortality assumptions or anything of that kind regardless.

The history here is that we are policyholders. We are not insurance companies. The type of document you are seeing here is not an insurance company document. It's not mortality assumptions. In fact, if we waited until there was some additional discovery to talk about the nature of the interests of both EAA and EFG, AXA would learn, for example, that EFG — or let's take EAA. EAA inherited the assets of WestLB or

Portigon. Portigon owned a security interest in these policies by making loans to other companies that themselves acquired the policies.

What you see when you see these valuations and a lot of documents like this are going to be loan administration documents, internal loan administration documents of a bank. And all they are doing is tracking the payments of the borrower that will need to be made or the value of their collateral to determine whether there is a default under the loan provisions. These things don't have to do with AXA's mortality assumptions.

In fact, this document here is dated June 2009, six years before AXA raised COI rates. Ms. Rappaport made a number of comments about what this reveals and I don't know where she gets that at all, including that the AXA policies are underpriced, because AXA's policies are priced at a certain level, but they have assumptions about premium payments that are more than just the cost of insurance charges.

So you can't tell anything from here other than the fact that in 2009, somebody on behalf of the policyholder's side expected to pay a certain amount of premiums over a particular period of time, and that particular period of time was determined by obtaining medical records from these insureds who authorized them to obtain these medical records and allowed them to come up with life expectancy estimates and, therefore, a cash flow estimate or a cash projection of how long they

would have to pay these premiums.

They don't bear on the reasonableness of AXA's mortality assumptions. In fact, it is the current assumptions that are at issue, not the prior assumptions. You can look at that what their original assumptions are. But as the documents that we submitted show, AXA's own mortality analysis, what they did was they looked at the deaths, how many people died over the span of a number of years and whether that was more than what they had expected.

When we challenge the reasonableness of that, we will be challenging whether they actually had a basis in looking at the number of deaths under the AULII group of policies for raising rates or claiming to have suffered adverse mortality. The fact that some individual has 84 months to live or 64 months to live when they are in 2009 and 74 years old is not going to bear upon that.

If there is a mortality assumption document, something out there that describes how we came up with certain assumptions, we are producing those documents. But here I will also say that when we talk about the history for EFG and EAA, these policies go back to I think 2004. You will have, I would guess, thousands of these types of reports, tons of e-mails we have done, and these are in the meet-and-confer letters that were submitted with the motion, just hit checks. So terms like LE, which would capture these life expectancies, I think we

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indicated had somewhere around tens of thousands of hits and cover this 10-year-period of time where the role is simply a lender trying to keep track of its security interest. Are they relevant? I don't think so. Have they shown that they are relevant? No. Have we refused to produce the things that are relevant? No.

The only outstanding issue here really are the EFG plaintiff documents. I'm mindful of the Court's ruling with regard to the Hague convention. EFG will have to decide what it needs to do with regard to that issue.

THE COURT: On that issue, brief digression, has EFG collected those documents in Switzerland?

MR. LeQUANG: There was a first wave of documents.

Those are all collected and ready for production. There were subsequent meet-and-confer discussions in which we agreed to collect from additional custodians and that collection and review is still in process, but it could be ready within weeks or something. It's hard for me to estimate at this point.

Certainly by custodians or by the review we could, in theory, roll out productions. The issue is what will EFG do in light of its concerns.

THE COURT: You better decide that sooner rather than later. I'm not staying any deadlines in connection with this matter. As far as I'm concerned, it's decided and you represented in your motion papers that you were prepared to

produce those materials. It was just a matter of how and when, not whether, and, therefore, you should have undertaken whatever efforts were needed to collect them. I would not expect that collection would cause any sort of delay.

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MR}}.$ LeQUANG: We have not delayed in any way that process.

THE COURT: Do you dispute the proposition that one could extrapolate from a document of this sort what mortality assumptions are being applied to this particular person? It sounds like you do.

MR. LeQUANG: I do. I don't see anything in here that suggests anything of what Ms. Rappaport had described can be gleaned from this particular document.

The one issue I did want to raise is, this was just given to me just prior to this hearing that wasn't submitted with the papers. I glanced at it briefly. I don't know and haven't had a chance to review it in its entirety, but, again, say that it is representative of the type of documents we intended to exclude for the reasons we have discussed.

THE COURT: What is your response to my thinking out loud that maybe some sort of sampling approach, giving them say five files, if I can call them that, as a way of providing them some means to sort of test their view that you can extrapolate relevant information from these documents? What is your response to that?

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MR. LeQUANG: It does alleviate the significant burden concern. Because I obviously don't think it's relevant, I do believe we can accommodate that to address this particular issue. I don't think a document like this shows anything, and one of the burdens that I also would mention, as you can see with this document, I still don't believe that AXA would be entitled to know the life expectancies or medical records or have access to the medical records of these insureds and, hence, we would need to redact any identifying information, even in the production to AXA of documents like this. I suspect they will still have sufficient identifying information within this document to know that one of the insureds under their policy has a particular life expectancy based on a particular medical record review.

THE COURT: You produced this particular document to them.

MR. LeQUANG: This was produced inadvertently. It was just brought to my attention and that's why it is being used today.

THE COURT: Here is what I am going to do on this front because I do want to move things along, recognizing that we are already far behind.

MS. RAPPAPORT: Your Honor, may I be heard briefly on a few points that Mr. LeQuang raised?

THE COURT: Very briefly. We have other ground to

cover, and I have other cases awaiting.

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MS. RAPPAPORT: Very quickly, your Honor. The fact that this document was a loan document, which is what's been represented here, that's not relevant. We are not looking at what the purpose of this was for. It is a valuation document. It does reflect mortality rates that an entity using an industry type table applying certain factors was using. That's No. 1.

With respect to the fact that the document is dated in 2009, plaintiffs have requested AXA's interim mortality assumptions. They are not limiting themselves to assumptions that we are at pricing or assumptions at the COI increase. Things in between they view as relevant. Just as they have argued that they are entitled to see how our mortality assumptions have developed, we are entitled to see how the entities that we are valuing their policies also develop their mortality assumptions.

Those were the two points I wanted to raise.

THE COURT: For now I am going to deny the defendant's motion on this particular score. I'm really not persuaded that the policy level documents that we are discussing are going to yield the kind of information that is relevant to the arguments that the defendant wants to make. I certainly understand that argument. I just don't necessarily see how the application, unless plaintiffs obtained individual health-related

information and on that basis felt that somebody was likely to
die sooner or live longer, whatever the case may be, that the
mortality assumptions would have it. I don't see how that
necessarily speaks to the reasonableness of the aggregate level

mortality assumptions.

Having said that, maybe I'm wrong, maybe I don't understand precisely how AXA would extrapolate from this particular document, by way of example, the information that Ms. Rappaport is describing, so here is what I propose.

That you confer about this and do so quickly and, in particular, that you confer with respect to my proposal of possibly using some sort of sampling approach where AXA has provided five or 10 sets of policy-related documents on the theory that that would minimize the burdens but provide enough of a window or peek, if you will, into whatever assumptions are being applied to the individual policies at issue if indeed it reveals them at all.

agreement, you can revisit this issue with me, in which case I would expect that using this document or otherwise, AXA should actually spell out in some detail how it would read into or read from this document the information that it says it needs, and that is to say, how it would use it and how it does speak to the reasonableness of the overall assumptions that are at issue. Why don't you do that. Why don't you meet and confer

sooner rather than later and let me know by the end of next week if you have reached agreement on this issue or if there are any issues that remain in dispute, in which case I will either have you back or resolve it at that point.

Next is the acquisition documents. According to the response, docket 146, plaintiffs have agreed to produce "any acquisition documents that bear on this issue, including documents concerning the circumstances under which AXA may or may not change COI rates, the possibility that AXA may or may not change COI rates, the COI provisions of the AULII policies and the COI increase." I must say, I would be a little bit anxious if I were in plaintiffs' shoes making those judgments and limiting disclosure only to things that meet that definition or those characteristics, but I certainly think that that adequately describes the relevant set of documents at issue, and in that regard I am not inclined to think that the broader set of acquisition-related documents is relevant here.

Ms. Rappaport, is there something I'm missing on that score?

MS. RAPPAPORT: Your Honor, first, this implicates the same valuation type issues that AXA believes it's entitled to review documents about how plaintiffs valued the policies when they acquired them, including what mortality assumptions they were applying and what they thought, cost of insurance, the appropriate cost of insurance rate or the cost of insurance rate that they would calculate, based on their mortality

assumptions, should be. For the same reasons that we were just discussing, we believe that those valuation documents are important to AXA's defense.

In addition, there is no reason to limit plaintiffs' production to just the possibility of a COI increase or the narrow categories that they have described. Plaintiff has not articulated why we are not entitled to documents that they have in their possession concerning cost of insurance rates on the AULII policies that they own or they have an interest in, and those are the types of documents that we are looking for.

We are not convinced that this narrowing is at all sufficient and, frankly, are concerned about the type of limiting that plaintiffs are trying to do and how they are determining — or a document showing an expectation of a different COI or what their internal COI rate or mortality rate would be, in our view, is something that bears on COI and goes to the possibility of the COI increase.

THE COURT: I agree. But maybe that just means that the devil is in the details of how broadly or capriciously one construes the category that I just read and that's from plaintiffs' letter. I would certainly think that documents relating to COI generally with mortality assumptions with respect to acquisition would fall within that category and be relevant, but I was reading it to include those. Am I wrong about that?

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MS. RAPPAPORT: Are you asking Mr. LeQuang?
THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LeQUANG: I don't think you are wrong. Again, one of the things that would be helpful is to explain what we are talking about here. And when we say acquisition documents, for example, as I mentioned before, EAA obtained ownership over the assets of WestLB through a governmental transfer of assets from the bank. There is a ton of agreements and a lot of e-mails and discussions about that transfer in connection with essentially the wind-up of WestLB. It has got nothing to do with the reasonableness of AXA's mortality assumptions or COI rates or anything like that.

But if there is something in there that says that these policies are subject to these COI increases or anything like that, we are agreeing to produce those documents.

THE COURT: I assume you would also agree anything in there that would relate to either these are the mortality assumptions that AXA is using or these are the mortality assumptions that we would apply or we think that this is underpriced or overpriced, that would also be subject to production.

MR. LeQUANG: Yes. Our production is based on agreed search terms. Many of the search terms are centered around things like underpriced, were or mortalities high, or rates or things like that. Yeah. We have agreed to produce those

1 documents.

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This big fight here is because there are going to be thousands of documents about various transactions and acquisition, quote, documents that have no bearing at all on any issue in this case, and we can't just blindly produce all of these acquisition documents.

As an example, too, this goes back to one of the original policy ownerships or policy structures. There were loans made to the original insureds. There were loan agreements. The agreements provided that the policies were the security for the loans. So you have a number of loan transaction documents. The original lender foreclosed on the policies. Then a bank that loaned money to that lender ended up foreclosing because that lender defaulted. None of these things have bearing on this. Yet, that's what we are fighting about here.

On the other hand, if they have to do with COI rate issues, we have agreed to produce them.

MS. RAPPAPORT: Your Honor, the documents valuing the policies for acquisition and diligence for the acquisition absolutely bear on the issues in this case because how the plaintiffs or a third party were valuing those documents in the portfolio necessarily relates to the mortality assumptions that were being applied. If you are talking about how long a person is going to live based on a set of an industry table and, as I

said, those other factors, that insurance companies and life settlement investors apply need to understand what mortality assumptions you're looking at for that particular portfolio policy or that particular policy in order to understand whether it's a worthwhile transaction for you.

Documents that were acquired during diligence on those policies or are valuing those policies are absolutely relevant to this case. And to just brush those aside as, well, they all relate to this one big transaction, we are entitled to documents concerning the AULII portfolio and how those were valued and what mortality assumptions were applied to those policies.

THE COURT: I hear you.

I am not persuaded that there is a need for me to grant any relief at this time, which is to say, that I think that it sounds to me like the plaintiffs are striking or drawing the line properly between what is relevant and what is not relevant. And defendant relies on Judge Francis' decision in the U.S. Bank case where he said that he's not willing to take at face value U.S. bank's assertion that it has produced all documents responsive and, therefore, directs them to produce a broader set of documents. But that's because he found that the line or their application of the line in that case was not proper.

If that turns out to be the case here and something is

revealed that indicates that there are documents that clearly are relevant that have not been turned over, perhaps I will go that route. As I said, if I were in plaintiffs' shoes, I might decide on that basis to produce a broader set of documents and not draw the line so strictly, which is another way of saying, you proceed a little bit at your peril.

For now, I think you are drawing the line appropriately, subject to the discussion that we had a few minutes ago, which is to say, if you agree, for example, that some subset of individual policy related documents should be produced so that defendant can make the argument, but on the basis of a sampling, presumably, that would extend to the acquisition-related documents concerning those particular policies as well.

Let's try to move quickly through the matters raised in the second letter. This is at docket No. 144. First, on e-mails and ESI custodians, am I correct that this pertains only to the Wells Fargo e-mails at this juncture?

MR. LeQUANG: If you are asking me, your Honor, the answer is yes, and I don't really think there is an issue. In fact, after receiving this motion, we called AXA's counsel to make sure they understood, we are producing e-mails from Wells Fargo, and they confirmed that they did understand that.

It was actually the filing of this motion that alerted us to the fact that, apparently, e-mails that we thought had

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been produced had not in fact been produced. But had they raised that with us, because we actually told them we had produced them, that they had not located any e-mails, we probably wouldn't have a motion. We would just be dealing with this. But the separate issue is, those e-mails came out of the system called FileNet, and FileNet is a shared repository.

Wells Fargo, as a securities intermediary, has primarily an administrative role here, and I don't want to sum up or categorize all of the duties under the securities account control agreement, but it is, generally speaking, administrative and they send, receive correspondence from the carrier to the entitlement holder, who is EFG. All of the substantive communications, e-mails, they are put on file now. Wells Fargo doesn't do much else with regard to the policies. As you have in the declarations that we submitted, all these kind of material communications, and they are not very material when we talk about Wells Fargo. They are on file now.

What AXA wants us to do is to go into e-mails of individual custodians, like the ones who upload the files to FileNet, and search their independent e-mail systems for additional e-mails, even though what should be relevant is on file.

The Sedona Conference principles recognize that when there is an information governance protocol, a protocol for putting systems on for documents for later use, you can rely on

that. Once they actually have a chance to review the documents and actually understand the scope of Wells Fargo's duties as securities intermediary, I think they could come back and raise issues about inadequacy of production, but I doubt that will be an issue. I will try to keep that simple.

THE COURT: Ms. Rappaport, briefly.

MS. RAPPAPORT: First of all, the Sedona principles case that plaintiffs reference has to do with document preservation, not whether a party has an obligation to search documents outside of that system, and plaintiffs are making these distinctions as what they believe are substantive and important, which is not how discovery works. They are supposed to be producing documents that are responsive to our discovery requests.

THE COURT: I think Mr. LeQuang's point that anything that has been responsive has been filed in FileNet.

MS. RAPPAPORT: Plaintiffs will not know that because they are refusing to search the files of, at this point, even eight, only eight custodians and their individual e-mail boxes. AXA has searched the files of over 60 custodians in connection with this litigation. And to request that plaintiff search eight or other custodians that they believe might have responsive documents should not pose a significant burden at all to Wells Fargo.

THE COURT: Are you deposing those eight people?

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MS. RAPPAPORT: It's possible that we will, but we need to see what the documents are that are coming from those people, which we have not received yet. I'm not in a position to fully understand what their roles are other than representations that have been made to us at this point.

THE COURT: I am going to leave it as is for now. If you depose somebody and determine that there is some basis to believe that they are likely to be relevant in responsive documents that are not filed in FileNet, then I would revisit it, but I am inclined to think that their protocols are sufficient.

Next is documents and information that Wells maintains in capacities other than as securities intermediary for EFG.

First of all, I take it that there is no longer any dispute concerning Wells' relationship as trustee to the EAA trusts. I understand that this case is not being brought by Wells as trustee for those trusts, but by the trusts directly in themselves. Is that correct?

MR. LeQUANG: That is correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Rappaport.

MS. RAPPAPORT: Yes, your Honor. But the Delaware code and the position that Wells Fargo holds under the code, and plaintiffs haven't showed us any documents otherwise, says the statutory trustee has control of the business and affairs of the entity to which it is serving as a trustee. Just

because it has a role as statutory trustee, as opposed to common law trustee, is, to AXA, distinction without a difference for that purpose, and plaintiffs haven't said anything other than, they are not a common law trustee, so, therefore, we don't have to produce their documents.

MR. LeQUANG: Your Honor, if I may.

THE COURT: You may.

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MR. LeQUANG: I don't know if this is certainly some confusion. But the fact the trustee has control is not the issue. Wells Fargo, as a trustee, is a distinct entity from the trusts, and the trusts don't control everything that Wells Fargo controls.

One thing I want to be clear, the trusts have produced documents from Wells Fargo as trustee that the trusts have control over. But the statutory trusts, those entities don't actually have control over Wells Fargo's internal e-mails.

That said, I'm kind of loathe to have much of a debate about this. If I can confer with Wells Fargo, because I think at bottom all of this is, do they need to serve a subpoena on Wells Fargo as trustee for the trust to get certain other documents. I'm sure we can forego that with further ado. I would like to offer that I confer with Wells Fargo and see if we can just agree that the documents will be requests served on us and will be effectively requested of them without requiring a subpoena.

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THE COURT: Why don't you do that and update me a week from Friday as well. The point of the meet-and-confer rules in my rules is make that happen before we are here and save me the time and trouble of both preparing and having to address this in court, but I will take up that invitation and have you do that.

With respect to Wells Fargo's status as securities intermediary, does your meet-and-confer offer extend to that as well?

MR. LeQUANG: Well, there is a broader issue on that, which is, I think that AXA would like the documents from Wells Fargo for all relationships that Wells Fargo has. Wells Fargo can't agree to that. They have brought this suit as the securities intermediary for EFG on the EFG policies. But EFG is an entitlement holder under the agreement with Wells Fargo. Wells Fargo is only authorized to bring suit on behalf of EFG. EFG can't authorize a suit on behalf of various other entitlement holders. And one example of that would be LSH, who subsequently filed suit. LSH is another entitlement holder where Wells Fargo acts as securities intermediary. There are at least many others. I can't recall offhand the number of other entitlement holders.

THE COURT: Fifty-four, I think.

MR. LeQUANG: What AXA wants is that Wells Fargo needs to go into all of their policy files and all of their FileNet

systems and pull all their documents. And that's what Wells

Fargo -- I think the main objection to that is relevance, but

also I think they have duties under their agreements with them

and with those other entitlement holders where they can't just

produce their documents. Our position is, in the first

instance, that other entitlement holders' policies are not

relevant and Wells Fargo should not have to produce those

documents, having brought a claim only as securities

intermediary for EFG.

THE COURT: Maybe I don't understand what documents would be in those files. But what if there are documents that speak to the reasonableness of the mortality assumptions and they just happen to be filed in connection with the different entitlement holder?

MR. LeQUANG: For example, and I think I can represent, although based on what I know today, Wells Fargo would not be evaluating or making any assessments about the reasonableness of anybody's mortality assumptions. As a securities intermediary it is simply the direct holder for an indirect holder. But would the assumptions of a third-party entitlement holder not communicated to any of the plaintiffs in this case that lie in their own files be relevant to this case? I would submit not. Otherwise, I suppose we could all subpoena every insurance company in the industry to get their mortality assumptions and say that they may bear upon the reasonableness

of AXA's mortality assumptions.

THE COURT: Ms. Rappaport, what do you expect to be in the documents or files relating to other entitlement holders that would be relevant here?

MS. RAPPAPORT: Your Honor, documents concerning AULII and documents concerning mortality assumptions applicable to AULLII and documents concerning AULLII cost of insurance. Plaintiffs here haven't shown us any agreement that would preclude Wells Fargo from producing documents that are in these files of these quote/unquote other entitlement holders, and there is a confidentiality order in place here which we have been abiding by, and we produced tons of confidential information to the plaintiffs, and we have had to go out and seek relief from other confidentiality agreements that we have in order to comply with requests in this case, and there is no reason that Wells Fargo should not be doing the same.

The other issue that's raised, and I think probably relates more to the first motion, your Honor, that we did not address was the issue of EFG standing to even bring this case. It claims it's an entitlement holder and it claims it has a beneficial interest in these policies. But we have seen nothing from Wells Fargo or EFG to show what policies are covered by the securities account control agreement. Plaintiffs have produced a list, but the list was unaccompanied by any e-mails or attached to any agreement, so we are not even

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sure what this list purports to be. But that certainly goes to the standing of EFG to pursue this action and those certainly would be documents that Wells Fargo may have in its files and should be produced.

THE COURT: That is a different matter and I certainly would agree that any documents relating to EFG would presumably be subject to production. We are getting a little bit ahead of ourselves, but I don't quite understand why documents pertaining to the reasons that Wells Fargo and EFG entered into the agreement, whatever the SACA stands for, securities account control agreement, why that would be relevant. But the agreement itself and any documents that would verify or underlie what policies are within the scope of that agreement I would certainly agree and think should be produced.

MS. RAPPAPORT: It's my understanding, your Honor, that one of the reasons why institutional investors enter into these securities account control agreements IS to facilitate the sale or transfer of policies. To the extent that a reason why they entered into this agreement was because they were or believed that COI would increase or that it related somehow to the COI that was on the policies would be relevant to the case. That's why we are seeking documents concerning the reasons why —

THE COURT: You are already getting documents concerning their mortality assumptions and COI and the prospect

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of COI increases and so forth, so that would fall within the scope of those and you would get them. Beyond that, I don't see what relevance the reasons that they entered into the securities account control agreement would have. I don't think you are entitled to that. But, again, that's separate and apart from whatever documents are needed to prove that EFG actually has standing to bring this. They should produce those.

I don't feel I have much a handle of what these other clients are or what might be in there. It doesn't sound to me like that they are likely to be relevant or their production would be proportional to the needs of this case, but in the interest of time, I am going to leave it there. You can always raise that with me again, if you discuss it further and you can't reach some sort of agreement to it, for now I am going to deny the defendant's motion on that front as well.

I think that covers everything, subject to the things that you'll be discussing in the next week and a half. Did I miss something?

MR. LeQUANG: I think you have covered everything.

MS. RAPPAPORT: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: The last thing is the sealing matter, docket No. 159. I received AXA's letter yesterday. I do approve sealing and redaction relating to Exhibits B and C, but am I correct that you are not seeking to keep under seal

Exhibit A, is that correct? 1 2 MS. RAPPAPORT: That's correct, your Honor. THE COURT: If you could file that within two days as 3 4 well, along with whatever redacted version of this document 5 that you handed up, that would be great. 6 Anything else? Very good. 7 I expect I will hear from you again, but, hopefully, 8 you will make some progress. 9 Mr. LeQuang, as I said, make sure you figure out what 10 you are doing on that Switzerland front. If you are not 11 intending to seek some sort of relief, and I don't think you 12 will get it, you better produce it sooner rather than later. 13 Deadlines are what they are and they are not stayed. 14 MR. LeQUANG: Judge, I understand the issue. 15 THE COURT: Thank you very much. 16 (Adjourned) 17 18 19 20 21 22 2.3

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